OFFICE DEPUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY PROCUMENTARPHALS 1 Vanessa L. Williams, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF VANESSA L. WILLIAMS, P.C. 2/14/20 2 414 WEST SOLEDAD AVENUE GCIC BLDG., SUITE 500 4:53 CLAN XPM BY CMW HAGÅTÑA, GUAM 96910 TELEPHONE: 477-1389 4 EMAIL: VLW@VLWILLIAMSLAW.COM 5 Attorney for Interested Party SH Enterprises, Inc. BEFORE THE PUBLIC AUDITOR 6 7 PROCUREMENT APPEALS 8 IN THE APPEAL OF: DOCKET NO. OPA-PA-19-011 9 BASIL FOOD INDUSTRIAL SERVICES CORPORATION, SH ENTERPRISES, INC.'S REPLY TO 10 APPELLANT BASIL FOOD 11 Appellant. INDUSTRIAL SERVICES CORPORATION'S OPPOSITION TO 12 SH ENTERPRISES, INC.'S MOTION 13 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 15 Appellant Basil Food Industrial Service Corporation's ("Basil") opposition to SH's 16 Motion for Summary Judgment ("Opposition") contains misstatements of facts and asserts several 17 arguments that are not supported by evidence or are otherwise irrelevant. The Opposition also 18 does not raise any genuine issues of material fact warranting denial of SH's Motion for Summary 19 Judgment ("MSJ"). 20 First, Basil's Opposition does not address SH's argument that the GSA did not violate the 21 Guam Procurement Law when it did not give the two-day notice under 5 GCA §5425(G)(2), 22 because this requirement applies only to post-award protests. It is undisputed that this is a post-23 award protest. Therefore, Basil has conceded this argument and summary judgment should be 24 granted on this issue. 25 Basil's remaining arguments are summarized as follows: (1) its Protest was timely 26 because it did not become aware of the facts giving rise to the appeal and was not aggrieved until 27 November 8, 2019 when the Notice of Intent to Award was issued; (2) SH is not a Responsive 28 Bidder because its voluntary withdrawal in April 2019 ("April 2019 conduct") from an earlier

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Certification, certifying that it had not been terminated for cause in the preceding three-year period; and, it was present when SH's bid was accepted. See Travis Decl. at Ex. B. In other words, on October 24, 2019 —the day the bid was opened — Basil was aware of the facts giving rise to this appeal, and had fourteen days from October 24, 2019, to submit its protest.

Notwithstanding this knowledge, Basil argues that it was not until it received the notice of intent to award on November 8, 2019 that it became an aggrieved party subject to the fourteenday deadline to submit a protest. *Opposition* at 3. The record does not support Basil's argument. Tellingly, Basil does not dispute that it had knowledge of the alleged contract termination, that it was present when the GSA accepted SH's bid, and that it knew that SH was the presumptive low bidder. Basil tries to circumvent these facts by arguing that the 14 day clock was not triggered until "the purchasing agency takes action upon which the protestor can be made aware of the facts to support its protect ... when GSA took official action in awarding the contract to SH." *Id.* This argument completely ignores the fact that Basil had the knowledge of the facts underlying its claim on bid opening day, thus triggering the 14-day clock. Moreover, Basil's argument should be rejected because it requires an interpretation that no bidder is aggrieved until the purchasing agency has awarded a contract and therefore, there could be no appeal prior to the award of a contract.

The Guam Supreme Court has stated that in connection with 5 GCA § 5425, "[a]n aggrieved party is '[a] party entitled to a remedy." *Teleguam Holdings LLC v. Guam*, 2018 Guam 5 ¶ 37. In reviewing the language of § 5425, a party "may be aggrieved in connection with the method of source selection, solicitation or award of a contract." Therefore, it is clear that a party is not aggrieved only once it has lost the contract bid but can also be aggrieved during the solicitation of a contract, which would include the process of accepting of bids.

Because Basil does not dispute and in fact affirmatively claims that it knew about the alleged April 2019 conduct at the time GSA issued the present bid, and because Basil was present at the bid opening on October 24, 2019, at which the GSA confirmed that SH had submitted all the required documentation, which Basil knew included the B-4 Certification, it was aware of all facts giving rise to this protest on the day of the bid opening. Assuming *arguendo* that Basil's

allegations about the April 2019 termination were true, Basil should have known it was entitled to relief upon GSA's acceptance of SH's bid as responsive and complete. Therefore, the fourteenday deadline within which Basil was required to submit a protest began on this date – October 24, 2019 – and Basil's submission of its protest on November 22, 2019 was untimely. These facts are not in dispute, and summary judgment in favor of SH should be granted on this basis.

B. SH WAS A RESPONSIVE BIDDER

Basil argues that SH was required to but failed to disclose (1) that it voluntarily but improperly withdrew from a contract because of an inability to perform the contract, and (2) that because its withdrawal was improper, it received an unsatisfactory inspection rating from DPHSS while the contract was still in effect, which triggered an automatic contract termination. Appellant's Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 4-6. On these grounds, Basil argues that SH should be disqualified as a nonresponsive bidder for failing to disclose the rating that led to the termination. Id. at 4. Basil's argument is that regardless of whether SH effectively withdrew from the contract, because the contract was "automatically terminated," SH was required to disclose. These arguments are legally unfounded and do not defeat summary judgment.

First, the OPA should reject Basil's speculation that SH's withdrawal is "suspicious" and should have been be disclosed in order for the "purchasing agency to conduct a thorough, proper review of each bidder's contract performance history." *Id.* at 5. This policy argument ignores the fact that there *is no* requirement under the IFB for this procurement or Guam Procurement Law — and Basil has not provided any authority — that a voluntary withdrawal from a prior contract must be disclosed in a bid for this procurement. There is no prejudice to Basil because, as Basil admits, the GSA was the purchasing agency under the former contract, and therefore, was already aware of this performance history. *Id.* at 5.

Related to this issue of non-responsibility is Basil's erroneous contention that SH was required to disclose the DPHSS rating because SH had not effectively withdrawn from the contract pursuant to 5 GCA § 5211(f) prior to the rating being given to SH. *Id.* at 4-5. Basil completely fails to support this theory of "automatic termination" with any legal authority. The argument also does not make sense. As stated above, there is no "automatic termination" under

the terms of the prior contract or under Guam law, and because GSA accepted SH's withdrawal, there was no termination, and SH did not have a duty to disclose.

Basil also takes issue with GSA's acceptance of SH's withdrawal in this procurement appeal, specifically, that the GSA failed to follow the statutory procedure for withdrawal. The acceptance of SH's withdrawal was proper and Basil does not establish otherwise. Basil's complaint about GSA's acceptance of SH withdrawal and whether it was compliant with statutory procedure does not change the fact that it was accepted, the prior contract was not terminated, and there was no prior termination or "citation" for SH to disclose in its bid for this procurement. SH does not control what third parties and the GSA do, and there has never been any prior determination that the withdrawal was somehow legally flawed or non-complaint. As such, the actions of GSA and third parties cannot support any disclosure obligation on the part of SH and cannot bind SH from bidding on this procurement and future procurements.

SH was not required to disclose a termination which never occurred. SH's bid complied with the IFB and was found to be a responsive bidder. Summary judgment should be granted on this issue and Basil's appeal should be denied on this issue.

C. GSA PROPERLY ADDRESSED ALL ISSUES BASIL RAISED IN ITS PROTEST

SH and GSA did not "misread" the Protest. Basil's now states in its Opposition that the DPHSS rating should have been disclosed in this procurement because of the requirement to disclose citations related to government contract performance. GSA's response that SH had voluntarily withdrawn from the contract prior to the rating sufficiently addressed this issue. See id. at 6. Basil was given a response on this issue, and the fact that it disagrees with GSA does not mean a response was not given. The Appeal should be denied on this issue.

D. GSA DID NOT CREATE AN UNFAIR PROCUREMENT ENVIRONMENT

Basil has not provided any legal authority to support why conduct unrelated to this procurement should be considered in this Appeal and why this issue, which is raised for the first time on Appeal, should be considered at all. Consideration of outside conduct in this appeal would

unduly prejudice SH, which was properly awarded this contract in this procurement. Further, Basil has not shown why it has standing to pursue such claims. See In re A.B. Won Pat Int'l Airport Auth., 2019 Guam 6 ¶ 42 n. 10 (citing Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 at 1650 (2017) ("[A party] must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief sought.") (citations omitted) (alteration in original)). As such, summary judgment in favor of SH should be granted on this issue and the appeal denied on this issue.

E. BASIL HAS ABANDONED THE ISSUE OF THE TWO-DAY NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF 5 GCA § 5425(G)

5 GCA § 5425(g) does not apply to this Protest because this is a post-award protest. *See* MSJ at 7-8. Basil did not address this issue in its Opposition and has therefore abandoned and conceded this issue. Accordingly, the Appeal should be denied on this issue.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment should be granted in favor of SH on all issues and the Appeal dismissed.

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of February, 2020.

LAW OFFICE OF VANESSA L. WILLIAMS, P.C. Attorneys for Interested Party SH Enterprises, Inc.



VANESSA L. WILLIAMS, ESQ.