1 2 3 4 5	BROOKS CONCEPICON LAW, P.C. 247 Martyr Street, Ste. 101 Hagatna, Guam 96910 (671) 472-6848 (671) 477-5790	RECEIVELD OFFICE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY PROCUREMENT APPEALS  DATE: Ay, 10, 20  TIME: 12:4 CLAM XIPM BY: Chim  FILE NO OPA-PA: 20 00 5
6	BEFORE THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY	
7 8 9 10	In the Appeal of  BEACH RESORT LLC dba THE HOTEL SANTE FE GUAM,  Appellant	OCKET NO. OPA-PA-20-005  APPELLANT'S OPPOSITION TO GSA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
12 13 14	BEACH RESORT LLC dba The Hotel Santa Fe ("Santa Fe"), by and through its counsel of record, submits this Opposition to GSA's Motion for Summary Judgment.	
15	BACKGROUND	
16	In May 2020, General Services Agency ("GSA") sent out a Request for Quotation for	
17	quarantine facilities the for the government of Guam to utilize for 14 day mandatory quarantine for	
18   19	arriving passengers from COVID-19 affected areas. See Appellant's Notice of Appeal ("NTA'"),	
20	Exhibit D. Attached to the Request for Quotation were "Attachments 1. Specifications 2. Terms	
21	and Conditions" and referenced on page 1 of the RFQ. <u>Id</u> .	
22	On or about May 15, 2020 Santa Fe provided a Quotation in response to the Request for	
23	Quotation ("RFQ") to serve as a quarantine facility. See NTA, Exhibit E.	
24	Santa Fe "was selected based upon meeting the standards required to house" passengers	
25	from COVID-19 affected areas. See NTA, Exhibit B.	
26 27	In a letter dated May 27, 2020, GSA informed Santa Fe that Purchase Order Number	
28 H022-01	P206E00310 was cancelled retroactively to May 23, 2020. See NTA, Exhibit F (May 27, 2020	

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28 H022-01 The only reason given by GSA in wrongfully terminating Santa Fe's Purchase Order ("Contract") was "findings by the National Guard and Homeland Security on their walk though on Saturday, May 23 2020 of [Santa Fe's] failure to meet the terms of the agreement." Termination Letter. Exhibit F, Santa Fe's Notice of Appeal, OPA-PA-20-005. "Based upon these violations, [GSA] [cancelled] the purchase order effective May 23, 2020." Id. GSA cites no other reason. Furthermore, GSA does not invoke any of the termination provisions it now claims is the basis on which it wrongfully terminated Santa Fe's Contract.

GSA cannot make up its mind as to whether Section IX of the Contract which includes the termination provisions it now claims applies.

In moving for summary judgment GSA contends it is an undisputed fact that "the PO [or Contract] includes and incorporates by reference twenty-seven pages of additional terms and conditions, each page of which was initialed and acknowledged by the Santa Fe's president, Mr. Bart Jackson." By making this assertion, GSA contradicts itself. One basis for denying Santa Fe's protest at the agency level was that Section IX of the Contract was NOT part of the terms and conditions referenced in the Contact. Emphasis added. In its moving papers, GSA conveniently ignores the fact that when it initially denied Santa Fe's protest, citing In the Appeal of Basil Industrial Food Services, OPA Appeal No. OPA-PA 16-006 and OPA-PA-16-008, GSA took the position that "a review of the purchase order did not indicate that a cure language was provided for, and as such, there is no right to have one." Agency Report, Tab 3. The FIRST time it took the position that the terms and conditions applied, which include inter alia the three termination provisions GSA now argues apply and the fourth termination provision (10 day-cure) invoked by Santa Fe, was in the Agency Report. In the Agency Report, GSA cites Section IX of the Contract in support of its contention that "as part of their submittal, [Santa Fe] agreed to the following terms and conditions..." Id. Tab 1. GSA argues that only the three termination provisions of Section IX

that benefit it apply and the one that Santa Fe relied on is not applicable.

GSA terminated Santa Fe's Contract due to its claim that GSA failed to comply with the terms of its Contract and provided a list of alleged deficiencies. GSA should not be allowed to argue that in hindsight they could terminate for cause or convenience as that is not why it terminated Santa Fe's contract. GSA is limited to its argument that Santa Fe's contract was terminated due to the alleged deficiencies in its June 10, 2020 Termination Letter and nothing else. Because GSA terminated Santa Fe's contract for one reason only, Santa Fe was correct in invoking Section IX(d) of the Contract in protesting GSA's termination of Santa Fe's Contract.

The mere fact that GSA flip-flops as to the reason it terminated Santa Fe's Contract should cause pause by the OPA. Guam's Procurement Code requires "all parties involved in the negotiation, performance, or administration of territorial contracts to act in good faith." 5 GCA § 5003. Based on the requirement that GSA act in good faith in administering its contract with Santa Fe, it was only fair that Santa Fe be given notice of the alleged deficiencies and 10 days to cure said deficiencies especially when the alleged deficiencies were based on a third-party's findings and did not jeopardize any of the passenger's health or isolation of passengers in the hotel. Santa Fe's contract is with GSA and not the National Guard. With regard to whether GSA acted in good faith, it is notable that two days before the termination of Santa Fe's contract became effective, GSA already entered into the exact same contract as Santa Fe's with another hotel on May 21, 2020 as if it anticipated terminating Santa Fe's Contract, which had only begun on May 19, 2020. The other hotel's rates were higher than Santa Fe's. GSA did not inform Santa Fe that its contract was cancelled until 4 days AFTER it was effective and after it removed all passengers from the hotel on May 24, 2020.

Pursuant to Section IX. A(iii), Termination for Cause Default ("10 day cure" provision):

If the Hotel refuses or fails to perform any of the provisions of this contract with such diligence as will ensure its completion within the time specified in this contract, or any

extension therefore, otherwise fails to timely satisfy the contract provisions, or commits any other substantial breach of this contract, the Procurement Officer may notify the Hotel in writing of the delay or non-performance and if not cured in ten days or any longer time specified in writing by the Procurement Officer, such officer may terminate the Hotel's right to proceed with the contract or such part of the contract to which there has been delay or failure to properly perform. In the event of termination in whole or in part the Procurement Officer may procure similar supplies or services in a manner and upon terms deemed appropriate by the Procurement Officer. The Hotel shall continue performance of the contract to the extent it is not terminated and shall be liable for excess costs incurred in procuring similar goods or services.

GSA terminated Santa Fe's contract for cause, *arguendo*, therefore, only this provision applies. GSA argues the 10-day cure provision does not apply and instead it had unfettered discretion to decide whether or not to allow Santa Fe 10 days to cure the alleged deficiencies. While GSA may have the discretion to determine whether or not to it should give Santa Fe 10 days to cure, said discretion must be exercised in good faith as required under 5 GCA § 5003.

In denying Santa Fe's protest at the agency level, GSA cites a portion of the OPA's Decision In the Appeal of Basil Industrial Services, Appeal Nos. OPA-PA 16-006 and OPA-PA-16-008 and argues that the ten day cure provision was not part of the terms and conditions of Santa Fe's contract. The regulation Basil argued applied to its contract included the language "the procurement officer may notify the contractor...and if not cured in 10 days...such officer may terminate the contractor's right to proceed with the contract..." In Basil, the OPA ruled "[i]f this regulation were applicable, GSA would have had to give Basil 10 days to cure its May 31, 2016 default and GSA would have then wrongfully terminated Basile' Contract..." Emphasis added. Here, based on the OPA's ruling that if the ten-day cure provision was part of Basil's contract, GSA would have had to give Basil 10 days to cure, GSA was required to give Santa Fe notice of the alleged deficiencies and 10 days to cure. It did not.

The "other termination provisions" which include termination without cause, termination in the best interests of the Government of Guam, and termination for convenience do NOT apply in

H022-01 this case. Tab 1. Each provision serves different purposes. <u>Basil v GSA</u>, 2019 Guam 29 ¶ 17 quoting <u>Dart Advantage Warehousing</u>, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 694, 707 (2002). ("[W]here a contract provides 'different and independent ways to terminate a contract, the two clauses have different purposes and provide different rights and obligations.".). To allow GSA to now in hindsight through everything on the wall and see what sticks renders these provisions meaningless and illusory.

GSA argues termination was in the best interest of the Government and cites Section IX(A)(ii) of the Contract which provides: "GHS OCD may terminate this Agreement based upon the determination that such termination is the best interests of the Government...Circumstances for termination under this clause include but are not limited to Hotel's successful completion of services under this Agreement to the satisfaction of GHS OCD." Contract, Section IX(A)(i). GSA puts emphasis on "to the satisfaction of GHS OCD." However, the court cannot read that language in isolation of the rest of the provision.

Ramiro v. White, 2016 Guam 6, ¶21 (Guam Feb. 12, 2016) ("Moreover, Decedent's agreement with Coast360 (i.e., the Instrument) should be viewed as a whole "so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other." 18 GCA § 87107 (2005); see also Gov't of Guam v. Pacificare Health Ins. Co. of Micronesia, 2004 Guam 17 ¶73 (an agreement "must be viewed as a whole, with each provision interpreted in light of each other, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable. When the intent is clear, the court must give effect to that intent." (citations and footnote omitted)).").

Reading the sentence in its entirety in conjunction with the rest of Section IX (A)Iii) leads to the conclusion that GSA's argument fails for at least two reasons. First, GSA did not include "its determination that such termination is in the best interests of the Government" in its Termination Letter. Second, this provision contemplates the purpose for the contract had been completed and it is no longer in the best interest to continue a contract when said purpose had been completed. The government could terminate a contract under this provision in the event funding runs out. GSA must show why it is in the GOVERNMENT's best interest to cancel Santa Fe's Contract and move the passengers to a new

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hotel. The test is not how it is in the best interests in the passengers. GSA does not and cannot show that the list of alleged deficiencies warranted the cancellation of Santa Fe's Contract.

GSA argues that "even without cause, GSA was entitled to terminate the contract because it was in the best interest to move quickly due to the COVID-19 public health emergency..." The termination without clause provision provides:

GHS OCD may terminate this Agreement without cause, upon the delivery of written notice to the Hotel at least thirty (30) days prior to the intended date of termination.

Contract, Section IX(A)(i). If the termination without cause provision applied, GSA is in breach as it failed to give Santa Fe 30 days' notice of its intent to cancel its Contract. The 30 day notice is required under Section IX(A)(iii). In its moving papers GSA glosses over the language of the termination without cause provision because it knows that it is in breach of this provision if it did apply.

The fact that the procurement was done under an emergency declaration by the Governor does not exempt GSA from abiding by the terms of the Contract and Guam Procurement Law. More importantly, even if the "other termination provisions" applied, neither justifies GSA's cancellation of Santa Fe's Contract as the alleged list of deficiencies were non-existent. The OPA should deny GSA's motion and move this matter to hearing at which time Santa Fe will present evidence supporting its contention that GSA wrongfully terminated its Contract.

## **CONCLUSION**

The OPA should deny GSA's motion for summary judgment as there is a dispute as to whether the termination for cause, no cause or convenience apply.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of August, 2020.

BROOKS CONCEPCION LAW, P.C.

By:

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