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PROCUREMENT APPEAL

IN THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

9 In the Appeal of

10 TAKECARE INSURANCE COMPANY,
11 INC.,

12 Appellant,

13 and

14 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION,

15 Purchasing Agency.

APPEAL NO. OPA-PA-19-005

**TAKECARE'S REBUTTAL TO
PURCHASING AGENCY REPORT**

INTRODUCTION

18 TakeCare disputes many of the material facts in DOA's denial of
19 TakeCare's protest and in its Agency Report. Inasmuch as material facts are
20 in dispute, an appeal hearing before the Hearing Office will be required. As
21 discussed in TakeCare's Protest dated May 3, 2019, TakeCare maintains that:
22 (1) PL 35-2 and the RFP are an improper delegation of authority; (2) PL 35-2
23 and the RFP are inconsistent with the Organic Act; (3) PL 35-2 and the RFP
24 eliminate "competition" and deny equal protection; (4) PL 35-2 and the RFP
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ORIGINAL
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1 do not create a “level playing field”; (5) PL 35-2 and the RFP will not result in
2 the “lowest cost option”; (6) PL 35-2 and the RFP will not “maximize”
3 GovGuam purchasing power; (7) PL 35-2 and the RFP discriminate against
4 other private clinics in Guam; and, (8) Guam Regional Medical City (“GRMC”)
5 is already in-network for emergencies and sole source situations

6 Notably, GovGuam makes no effort to directly address the issues raised
7 by TakeCare in its Protest. Instead, GovGuam raises only procedural
8 defenses in response to the Protest and argues that TakeCare’s Protest is
9 “untimely” and “beyond the scope of this procurement.” Both these
10 procedural defenses are factually and legal flawed.
11

12 DISCUSSION

13 I. TakeCare’s Protest is Timely.

14 GovGuam argues that TakeCare should have filed its Protest within 14
15 days after the RFP was published on April 1, 2019. However, PL 35-2 does
16 not require that offerors have a “direct contract” with GRMC or any other
17 private hospital on the date the RFP is published. In fact, PL 35-2 does not
18 require that TakeCare ever have a “direct contract” with GRMC. Instead, PL
19 35-2 merely require that GRMC be in the “network” of offerors when an offer
20 is submitted. Thus, TakeCare was not required to know on April 1, 2019
21 whether GRMC would be in its network. More importantly, TakeCare **did not**
22 **know until May 1, 2019** that GRMC would not be in its network because
23 GRMC waited until that date to insist that TakeCare have a “direct contract”
24 with GRMC, which is contrary to the requirements of PL 35-2.
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1 Moreover, the RFP itself expressly allowed offerors to have an indirect
2 relationship with GRMC via a “rental” or “lease” agreement. As explained in
3 the Protest, TakeCare intended to utilize a previously arranged Network
4 Access Services Agreement with NetCare; which arrangement allowed NetCare
5 to lease to TakeCare in-network access to GRMC. (Protest Exhibits 11 and
6 12). TakeCare **did not know until May 1, 2019** that GRMC would “not allow
7 any other local health plan to access NetCare’s in-network rates with GRMC”
8 and that all “Guam-based health plans need to directly contract with GRMC
9 for in-network rates.” (Exhibit 1).

10 In addition to challenging the constitutionality of PL 35-2 on its face,
11 TakeCare is also challenging the constitutionality of PL 35-2 “as applied.”
12 **TakeCare could not have known on April 1, 2019 that PL 35-2 is**
13 **unconstitutional “as applied”** because it did not know on that date that
14 GRMC would: (a) Persist in requiring that TakeCare agree to allow its federal
15 and commercial members to utilize GRMC; (b) Persist in requiring TakeCare
16 to pay millions of dollars to GRMC that is not legally owed; (c) Persist in
17 requiring that GRMC have a direct contract with it; and, (d) Refuse to allow
18 local health plans to utilize NetCare’s access service agreement with GRMC.
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20 Lastly, contrary to the assertions of GovGuam, TakeCare’s inability to
21 “secure a business opportunity” with GRMC is most certainly relevant.
22 Evidence Rule 401 provides that evidence is relevant if it has “*any* tendency
23 to make a fact more or less probable . . . and the fact is of consequence in
24 determining the action.” “It is well established that the standard for
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1 determining the relevancy of evidence is 'extremely liberal.'" Physician Care,
2 P.C. v. Caremark, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (E.D. Mich. 1998). The
3 primary purpose of PL 35-2 and the RFP is to require an in-network business
4 relationship between offerors and GRMC. The events taking place between
5 April 1, 2019 and May 1, 2019 when TakeCare was attempting to secure a
6 business relationship with GRMC are relevant because those facts establish
7 that PL35-2 and the RFP are unconstitutional "as applied."

8 **II. The Issues Raised by TakeCare are not "Beyond The Scope"**
9 **of the Procurement**

10 Unable to directly address the issues raised by TakeCare in its Protest,
11 GovGuam instead argues that the wrongful and outrageous actions of GRMC
12 are not related to the procurement process and "beyond the scope of this
13 procurement." However, **PL 35-2 and the RFP expressly requires that as**
14 **part of the procurement process a prospective offeror must have GRMC**
15 **in its network.** Hence, it is undisputed that as part of the procurement
16 process a potential offeror must have an "in-network" relationship with
17 GRMC.
18

19 GovGuam itself confirms that an in-network relationship with GRMC is
20 part of the procurement process when it then argues that because TakeCare
21 was "unable to secure an agreement with GRMC" it "is not an actual or
22 prospective offeror or contractor." That is exactly the point that TakeCare is
23 making in its protest. Namely, that GRMC not GovGuam is deciding who
24 may be an offeror because GRMC and not GovGuam controls who has GRMC
25 in its network.
26

1 More importantly, as predicted by both DOA and Calvo's SelectCare in
2 Legislative testimony on Bill No. 21-34, GRMC has used the power bestowed
3 upon it by PL 35-2 to eliminate TakeCare as an offeror by demanding
4 unreasonable conditions, and contract terms including higher rates. See e.g.,
5 Legislative testimony of DOA stating that requiring offerors to include GRMC
6 in their networks would "force carriers to accept whatever fees are
7 established" by GRMC and those that refused to do so "would be disqualified
8 from bidding on the Government's health insurance contract since they would
9 not have the private hospital as one of their providers." (Protest Exhibit 14 at
10 3). SelectCare also predicted that requiring offerors to include GRMC in their
11 networks would allow GRMC to make unreasonable demands on prospective
12 offerors. (Protest Exhibit 14).

14 The actions of GRMC have now confirmed that DOA's concerns about
15 requiring offerors to have an in-network relationship with GRMC were
16 justified because GRMC is now able to eliminate any prospective offeror by
17 simply refusing to have a network relationship, which is exactly what has
18 happened. GRMC has refused to enter into a contract with TakeCare relating
19 only to GovGuam members and instead used the leverage given to it by PL
20 35-2 and the RFP to insist that TakeCare also enter into a contract with
21 GRMC in-network for all of TakeCare's lines of business, including
22 commercial and federal members. GRMC has also wrongfully insisted that
23 TakeCare pay amounts to GRMC that TakeCare does not legally owe and
24 proposes to charge TakeCare rates that are higher than the ones it charges
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1 other carriers. It is for these reasons that TakeCare maintains in its Protest
2 and in this appeal that PL 35-2 and the RFP are an improper delegation of
3 authority.

4 Instead of trying to justify the legality of PL 35-2 and address the
5 problems raised by TakeCare in its Protest, GovGuam is forced to merely
6 argue that it is "required to follow the laws" such as PL 35-2 and as a
7 consequence the validity of those laws is "beyond the scope of this
8 procurement." TakeCare agrees that GovGuam is required to "follow the
9 laws," just as TakeCare is legally entitled to challenge the validity of those
10 laws. In its Protest and in this Appeal, TakeCare is challenging the validity of
11 PL 35-2 and the RFP attempting to implement it.
12

13 However, in order to challenge the validity of PL 35-2 in Court,
14 TakeCare must first exhaust its administrative remedies. Island Bay Utilities,
15 Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Environmental Management, 587 So. 2d 1210, 1212
16 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)(A party can only resort to judicial review of an
17 administrative action after exhausting all administrative remedies and raising
18 constitutional issues is not sufficient to avoid that requirement.); and, Pickett
19 v. Texas Mut. Ins. Co., 239 S.W.3d 826, 830-838 (Tex. App. 2007)(Even when
20 raising "numerous violations of their constitutional rights," judicial claims
21 will be dismissed for the "failure to exhaust administrative remedies.").
22 TakeCare, therefore, is not merely allowed to pursue its administrative
23 remedies in this Appeal, it is required to exhaust those administrative
24 remedies before challenging the legal validity of PL 35-2 in Court.
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1 Finally, the events taking place between April 1, 2019 and May 1, 2019
2 when TakeCare was attempting to secure a business relationship with GRMC
3 are not “beyond the scope of the procurement” because those facts establish
4 that PL35-2 and the RFP are unconstitutional “as applied.” GovGuam
5 cannot simply enact legislation like PL 35-2, which requires offerors to
6 interact with a private entity, and then divorce itself from any wrongdoing
7 committed by that private entity. This is especially true when it is
8 undisputed that **GovGuam itself predicted that legislation like PL 35-2**
9 **would be used by a private entity like GRMC to “disqualify” offerors**
10 **“from bidding on the Government’s health insurance contract since they**
11 **would not have the private hospital as one of their providers.”** (Protest
12 Exhibit 14 at 3).

14 **III. PL35-2 and the RFP Are Unconstitutional and Inorganic**

15 Both PL 35-2 and the RFP require that offerors have GRMC in their
16 networks in order to bid on the GovGuam health insurance contract. Hence,
17 if PL 35-2 is unconstitutional for any reason, then the RFP is “in violation of
18 the law” and must either be “cancelled or revised to comply with the law.” 5
19 G.C.A. 5451. However, in order to challenge the constitutionality of PL 35-2
20 and the RFP in Court, TakeCare must first exhaust its administrative
21 procedures before the OPA. Island Bay Utilities, Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of
22 Environmental Management, 587 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)(A
23 party can only resort to judicial review of an administrative action after
24 exhausting all administrative remedies and raising constitutional issues is
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1 not sufficient to avoid that requirement.); and, Pickett v. Texas Mut. Ins. Co.,
2 239 S.W.3d 826, 830-838 (Tex. App. 2007)(Even when raising “numerous
3 violations of their constitutional rights,” judicial claims will be dismissed for the
4 “failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”). Once those constitutional
5 issues are raised, the OPA has jurisdiction to “determine de novo” any matters
6 submitted to him/her and “no prior determination shall be final or conclusive
7 on the Public Auditor.” OPA Rule 12103(a).

8 **A. PL 35-2 and the RFP Are An Improper Delegation of Authority.**

9 TakeCare sought to comply with PL 35-2. The proposal by GRMC to
10 TakeCare for GovGuam in-network was expressly conditioned upon
11 TakeCare’s inclusion of TakeCare’s commercial and federal members also
12 being in-network for health care services at GRMC. GRMC also insisted that
13 none of TakeCare’s plans include a buy up option. In addition, as a condition
14 for entering into an agreement with TakeCare, GRMC wrongfully demanded
15 that TakeCare pay for past services to its members, which TakeCare has no
16 legal obligation to pay on the grounds that: (a) TakeCare had no Direct Payer
17 Agreement with GRMC at the time of such alleged services; (b) Many of the
18 alleged services were not covered by the terms of any of TakeCare’s plans;
19 and, (c) Even if TakeCare had a Direct Payer Agreement with GRMC, and even
20 if the alleged services had been covered, the GRMC claims submitted to
21 TakeCare patients/TakeCare were time-barred under the provisions of
22 Guam’s Prompt Payment Act and/or the statute of limitations. In simple
23 terms, GRMC is holding up TakeCare and preventing it from qualifying to
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1 respond to the RFP by demanding that TakeCare agree to include GRMC in-
2 network for all of its members, including its commercial and federal
3 members. GRMC is further insisting that TakeCare pay for claims that it
4 does not owe. All of these extortionate demands must be met before GRMC
5 will enter into a contract with TakeCare relating to GovGuam members.

6 If offerors are required by PL 35-2 to contract with GRMC in order to
7 submit a proposal in response to the RFP, GRMC can completely control the
8 outcome of the RFP process by eliminating any prospective offeror by simply
9 refusing to have a network relationship with that insurer. That is exactly
10 what has happened. GRMC has refused to enter into a contract with
11 TakeCare relating only to GovGuam members. Instead, GRMC has
12 wrongfully used the leverage given to it by PL 35-2 to insist that TakeCare
13 also enter into a contract with GRMC in-network for all of TakeCare's lines of
14 business, including commercial and federal members. GRMC has also
15 wrongfully used its perceived leverage from PL 35-2 to demand that TakeCare
16 pay amounts to GRMC that TakeCare does not legally owe. Lastly, GRMC
17 proposes to charge TakeCare rates that are higher than the ones it charges
18 other carriers.
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21 GRMC is maliciously using PL 35-2 and the RFP to eliminate or
22 disadvantage TakeCare as an offeror by demanding unreasonable conditions,
23 and contract terms including higher rates. This scenario was predicted by
24 DOA itself when it previously opposed Bill No. 21-34 that required offerors to
25 include GRMC in their networks. In Legislative testimony on Bill No. 21-34,
26

1 DOA noted that requiring offerors to include GRMC in their networks would
2 “force carriers to accept whatever fees are established” by GRMC and those
3 that refused to do so “would be disqualified from bidding on the Government’s
4 health insurance contract since they would not have the private hospital as
5 one of their providers.” (Exhibit 14 at 3). DOA’s fears about GRMC making
6 unreasonable demands on offerors were well founded. SelectCare and
7 TakeCare also predicted that requiring offerors to include GRMC in their
8 networks would allow GRMC to make unreasonable demands on prospective
9 offerors. (Exhibit 14).

10
11 The actions of GRMC clearly prove that the practical effect of PL 35-2
12 and the RFP has been to delegate the authority to GRMC to determine who
13 can participate in the GovGuam RFP process. GRMC can make demands
14 upon prospective offerors like it has done to TakeCare that are not required
15 by PL 35-2, but which are designed to disqualify TakeCare. As a consequence
16 of PL 35-2, GRMC could in fact unilaterally refuse to have an in-network
17 relationship with any potential offeror, and, thereby prevent GovGuam from
18 having any health insurance coverage.

19
20 PL 35-2, therefore, is the text book case of an improper delegation of
21 executive because it allows a private entity, such as GRMC, to determine
22 what entities may participate in and ultimately win a contract with the
23 government. See *e.g.* G. Curtis Martin Investment Trust v. Clay, 266 S.E.2d
24 82 (S.C. 1980)(It is an improper delegation of power to allow a private entity
25 to control who participates in government owned sewer system); Texas Boll
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1 Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997)(It is
2 an unconstitutional delegation of authority to allow a private foundation
3 whose members have a pecuniary interest to assess costs against other
4 private companies); and, People v. Pollution Control Board, 404 N.E. 2d 351
5 (Ill. App. 3d 1980)(Allowing private automobile association to determine which
6 events are subject to regulations is an improper delegation of legislature
7 authority).

8 **B. PL 35-2 and the RFP Deny TakeCare Due Process of Law**

9 It is undisputed that GRMC has refused to enter into a provider
10 agreement with TakeCare relating to GovGuam members unless: (a) TakeCare
11 also allows its federal and commercial members to access GRMC; and, (b)
12 TakeCare agrees to pay millions of dollars to GRMC that is not legally owed.
13 Thus, as a consequence of PL 35-2 and the RFP, TakeCare has been
14 effectively debarred or suspended from bidding on any further GovGuam
15 health care contracts.
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17 Moreover, there is no procedural mechanism in place for GovGuam to
18 review the refusal of GRMC to enter into provider agreements with potential
19 offerors. To the contrary, GovGuam claims that it is “not able to respond” to
20 the refusal of GRMC to enter into a provider agreement with TakeCare
21 because GRMC is a “private entity.” DOA Denial of TakeCare’s Protests
22 5/21/19 at 2. In simple terms, GovGuam has interpreted PL 35-2 and the
23 RFP to allow GRMC to unilaterally debar or suspend potential offerors
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1 without any procedural mechanism in place for the review of GRMC's
2 decisions.

3 The Organic Act states: "No person shall be deprived of life, *liberty*, or
4 *property* without due process of law." 43 USC Section 1421b(e). "One who
5 has been dealing with the government on an ongoing basis may not be
6 blacklisted, whether by suspension or debarment, without being afforded
7 procedural safeguards including notice of the charges, an opportunity to
8 rebut those charges, and, under most circumstances, a hearing." Transco
9 Sec., Inc. of Ohio vs. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318, 321 (6th Cir. 1981). "Due
10 process requires that a contractor be given notice of a pending debarment
11 proceeding and the opportunity of a hearing to present objections or
12 arguments." Joseph Const. Co. vs. Veterans Admin. of U.S., 595 F. Supp.
13 448, 451 (N.D. Ill. 1984). "[F]undamental principles of due process mandate
14 that standards must be established to define the conduct that will result in
15 individual debarment." Department of Labor v. Titan Construction Company,
16 504 A.2d 7, 16 (N.J. 1985).

17
18 PL 35-2 and the RFP are constitutionally infirm because they do not
19 contain a procedural mechanism that allows GovGuam to review the decision
20 of a private entity such as GRMC to effectively debar or suspend TakeCare as
21 a potential offeror. There are also no standards in PL 35-2 allowing an offeror
22 to participate in the GovGuam health care procurement if GRMC refuses to
23 enter into any network relationship with a potential offeror. TakeCare,
24 therefore, has been denied both procedural and substantive due process.
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1 **C. PL 35-2 and the RFP Deny Equal Protection**

2 “The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
3 Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against
4 intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
5 terms of a statute or its improper execution through duly constituted agents.”
6 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1075 (2000).

7 GovGuam has allowed GRMC pursuant to PL 35-2 and the RFP to
8 decide who will be qualified as a potential offeror for the GovGuam health
9 insurance contract. As already discussed, GRMC has refused to enter into a
10 provider agreement unless TakeCare also agreed to allow its federal and
11 commercial employees to access GRMC. **This decision by was arbitrary and**
12 **capricious because TakeCare’s federal and commercial members have**
13 **nothing to do with GovGuam members.**

14 GovGuam certainly could not disqualify TakeCare as a potential offeror
15 because TakeCare refused to allow its commercial and federal members to
16 access GRMC. It is therefore logical to conclude that GovGuam cannot do so
17 by delegating this power to a private proxy such as GRMC.
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CONCLUSION

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2 For the numerous reasons discussed herein and in TakeCare's Protest,
3 TakeCare respectfully submits that the RFP at issue must be cancelled and
4 re-issued without the requirement of a private hospital be included in the
5 qualified offeror's network.

6 Respectfully submitted this 20th day of June 2019.

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8 Attorney for Appellant
9 TakeCare Insurance Company, Inc.

10 By:

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12 _____
13 Louie J. Yanza
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